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RULES, STANDARDS, AND SUITABILITY:
FINDING THE CORRECT APPROACH TO
PREDATORY LENDING
Abraham B. Putney*
INTRODUCTION
The humorist Dave Barry once wrote:
[t]he desire to own a home of one's own has been part of human
nature ever since that fateful moment, millions of years ago, when
our earliest ancestors climbed down out of their trees and moved
into their very first caves. It was a major moment in history, and its
glory was dimmed only slightly by the fact that their furniture did
not arrive for another 250,000 years.'
Regarding financing a home, Barry stated: "you are definitely going
to need the bank to give you a lot of money in the form of a mortgage.
The bank is willing to do this because, the way mortgages are set up,
no matter how many payments you make, you still owe the bank all the
money you ever borrowed."'2 The frustration with mortgages that
Barry points out is common. Mortgages are an expensive,3 but
normal4 part of owning a home. While Barry's statement is meant as a
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Richard S. Carnell for introducing me to the topic of predatory lending. I
would also like to thank my family and friends for their support during the writing of
this Note.
1. Dave Barry, Dave Barry's Homes and Other Black Holes, at vii-ix (1988).
2. Id. at 41.
3. Expensive is, of course, relative. For example, on an eight percent interest
loan of $200,000 (compounded monthly), paid out over thirty years, the total
repayment of principal and interest would come out to $528,310.80 (or $1467.53 a
month). This is exclusive of any fees that might be applied by a lender in addition to
the actual repayment of the loan. It is not unheard of for a predatory lender to charge
twenty percent interest. Kathy M. Kristof, Understanding, Guarding Against Abusive
Practices, L.A. Times, September 10, 2001, at C5. It has even been suggested that, in
some cases, with fees added in, the rate has gotten as high as over sixty-six percent.
Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved with Good
Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market,
51 S.C. L. Rev. 473, 564 (2000) (citing congressional testimony).
4. According to U.S. Census Data, of over 72 million owner-occupied American
homes, less than 26 million were owned free and clear (i.e. without a mortgage). U.S.
Census Bureau, American Housing Survey for the United States: 2001, available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahsO1/tab315.html (Nov. 1, 2002). Also,
the number of home purchases and the mortgages associated with them are on the
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humorous exaggeration, the shocking thing is, for some borrowers, it
can be an accurate description of their loans.'
For those Americans who do not have sufficient income or credit to
receive a standard mortgage, obtaining funding can be especially
frustrating. The funds that can be so essential are often unavailable to
those who need them.6 In response to this dilemma, there has been a
tremendous growth in a "subprime" market that gives loans to people
who could not otherwise afford them.7 The development of the
subprime market, however, has not been entirely positive because
there is another sort of loan, a predatory loan, which at times can be
difficult to distinguish from a subprime loan.8 Although a definition
of what constitutes a predatory loan may be elusive, there is a
widespread belief that there are certain loan practices and terms that
ought to be prohibited.' Loans containing such terms, referred to
collectively as "predatory loans," have been blamed for a great deal of
evil in recent years."'
rise.
Sixty-eight percent of all American families own homes, the most ever, and a
notable increase from 64% just ten years ago. And that market is being held
aloft by a wealth of refinancings supported by low interest rates. Today,
there are 70% more mortgage transactions than in an average home
purchase-driven market and ten times more refinancings than in an average
purchase-driven market.
James Peterson, Mortgage Lending: What to do when the boom is over, A.B.A.
Banking Journal, Jan. 2003, at 26.
5. Or worse, in a process known as "negative amortization," it is possible for a
borrower to actually owe more after each payment. 12 C.F.R § 226.32(d)(2) (2001)
(banning such loans when they fall within a certain class).
6. Ronald K. Schuster, Lending Discrimination: Is the Secondary Market Helping
to Make the "American Dream" a Reality?, 36 Gonz. L. Rev. 153, 154-55 (2001).
7. Figures indicate that the past decade, in particular, showed a remarkable
increase in subprime lending:
[I]n 1990 subprime home equity loan origination volume was at $7 billion.
By contrast, in 1996 subprime loan origination volume was between $100
billion and $150 billion-most of which was home equity lending. By 1997
home equity subprime origination generated around $125 billion. This made
up about "11.5% of the total home equity lending market in 1996" and
15.5% of the market in 1997. By another estimate, between 1995 and 1997
"subprime lenders more than tripled their market share of the total
mortgage market.., originating a full 15% of all mortgages, up from 4% in
1995." By a third estimate, the number of subprime nonpurchase loans
increased by 890% between 1993 and 1998. In 1999 subprime loans are
expected to make up more than 10% of the mortgage market and account
for more than $150 billion in loan originations.
Mansfield, supra note 3, at 528-29 (citations omitted); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 215, 392-403
(2002).
8. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
9. This belief is apparently held by many lawmakers on all levels of government,
as well as quite a few scholars. See infra Part II.
10. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
PREDA TORY LENDING
The purpose of this Note is to analyze some of the specific
legislative initiatives that have been suggested, attempted, or enacted,
to remedy the problem of predatory lending." Part I provides an
introduction to subprime lending and predatory lending. This Part
examines the difficulties of legislating against abusive loans and
establishes a framework of three categories into which an anti-
predatory lending law can fall. Part II provides an overview of the
current federal law on the topic, as well as some state and local laws.
It also reviews some of the scholarly literature on the topic. With
each of the laws or proposed laws, this Note attempts to identify what
category or categories the law falls into. Finally, Part III argues that
anti-predatory lending legislation should focus on concrete rules and
avoid loose standards. This Part suggests that the best way of
mitigating the harshness of objective rules is to use gradations within
the subprime loan category.
I. AN AMERICAN DREAM DEFERRED
There are few goals as deeply embedded in the American psyche as
home ownership. Yet, predatory lending has emerged as a threat to
the attainment of this goal. The problem of predatory lending is a
complex one, and any solution will have to address many concerns.
This part discusses the nature of the problem that predatory lending
presents. The first section briefly describes the nature of mortgage
borrowing and explains where predatory lending enters the picture.
The second section describes the difficulties that arise in attempting to
legislate against predatory lending. Finally, the third section
establishes categories into which the existing and proposed legislation
regarding predatory lending can be grouped.
A. The Emerging Problem
Home ownership is a fundamental aspect of American life-a
dream to which many aspire."2 On the other hand, purchasing a home
is one of the most complex and expensive transactions that a typical
person will be involved in.'3 Practically all homes are purchased with
the aid of outside financing, and such financing typically comes in the
11. What this Note will not do is state a preference as to how the specific
prohibitions should be structured. Often, especially with state and local ordinances,
this will depend highly on the particular circumstances. Rather, the Note dedicates
itself to analyzing the approaches taken: objective rules, subjective standards, and
educational initiatives.
12. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical
Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 Tul.
L. Rev. 373, 374 (1994); Schuster, supra note 6, at 154.
13. See Iylce R. Glink, Home Buying Pitfalls: Common Money Mistakes, L.A.
Times, Feb. 9, 1997, at K1.
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form of a mortgage.14
1. Mortgages and Subprime Lenders
Mortgages are pledges of property given to secure a loan,
particularly one that involves the same property. 5 In the home loan
context, a mortgage is often obtained to finance the home or can be
obtained to access funds by offering equity in the home as security.
Obtaining a normal mortgage can be a traumatic experience for
anyone." All the hopes of owning a home, combined with the fear of
rejection, produce a unique borrowing experience. For an
unsophisticated consumer, this may be the most complex financing
arrangement they ever encounter. 7 Second mortgages on the same
property carry with them their own unique emotional issues. A
second mortgage is typically a loan of last resort, risking the equity
that one has acquired in a home in exchange for much needed
money." Considering the value Americans place on their homes, a
particular spirit of need, 9 opportunity,2 ' or desperation2' moves one to
encumber his or her home with another mortgage.
The above issues make obtaining a mortgage a significant event in
the financial life of most Americans. Lenders typically wish only to
make loans that they believe will be repaid.22 They screen consumers'
financial information to learn the likelihood of the loan obligation
being fulfilled.23
Nevertheless, prospective borrowers do not need to have perfect
14. See supra note 4. Moreover, of the approximately 26 million homes that are
mentioned as being owned without a mortgage, many of those are so because the
mortgage has been paid off.
15. Black's Law Dictionary 1026-27 (7th ed. 1999).
16. See Carl Larsen, Seminars Explain Ins and Outs, San Diego Union-Tribune,
July 28, 2002, at 12.
17. "[E]ven business-school graduates can't read all the disclosure documents that
accompany a mortgage today." David Wessel, Capital: An Inner-City Predator Needs
a New Leash, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 2001, at Al.
18. See, e.g., Fred R. Bleakley, A 125% Solution to Card Debt Stirs Worry: Second
Mortgage Trend May Signal Economic Trouble, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1997, at A2
(discussing a family that encumbered its home for more than its value to pay off credit
card debt).
19. See, e.g., Kaja Whitehouse, How Do I Raise Cash Quickly?, Wall St. J., Jan.
28, 2002, at R6 (describing second mortgages as a possible contingency plan in case of
financial need).
20. Cf Maggie Jackson, Entrepreneurship Is Fun. Then There's the Day Job., N.Y.
Times, May 19, 2002, § 3, at 9 (describing second mortgages as a source of funds one
might consider while pursuing a new opportunity).
21. See Evelyn Nieves, Region's Quick-Cash Frauds Snare Desperate Consumers,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1992, at Al (describing mortgage lenders who appeal to a
borrower's sense of desperation).
22. HUD-Treasury Task Force on Predatory Lending, Curbing Predatory Home
Mortgage Lending, 29-30 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/
pdf/treasrpt.pdf (n.d.).
23. Id.
2104 [Vol. 71
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credit in order to obtain a mortgage. 4 Lenders will take the risk
associated with a loan into account when determining how much to
charge for the loan.25 Standard lenders might accept a certain level of
risk in exchange for a higher potential profit. For borrowers who do
not have sufficient means or credit to secure a loan from a standard
lender, there is a class of lenders, known as "subprime" lenders, who
provide these loans.2" Subprime lenders provide loans to higher-risk
borrowers and seek a higher profit in exchange for the added risk.
27
Subprime lenders can have a positive impact because they enable
some people who otherwise could not have purchased a home to do
SO.
28
The danger that has been recognized in this area, however, is the
possibility that in making a loan a lender may be too aggressive.29
Aggressive lending can be accomplished either by using a borrower's
ignorance and fear to lend on exploitive terms or by disregarding a
borrower's ability to repay entirely and granting a loan intending
eventually to foreclose.3" These practices are commonly referred to
collectively as "predatory lending."'"
24. Id. at 27-28.
25. Id. at 28. "Charge" here refers to any method the lender uses to gain a profit
on a loan. For example, increased charges might include not only higher interest rates
but other fees and expenses as well.
26. Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 102
(2001) (revised prepared statement of Professor Charles W. Calomiris).
27. See id.
28. The subprime lending industry is rather proud of their role in the creation of
new home ownership:
It is imperative to note that subprime lending has been extremely beneficial
to thousands of families in the last couple of years. Subprime lending has
opened up new markets and helped many consumers that would not have
received needed funds but for the special products available in this sector of
the market.
Id. at 311 (prepared statement of John A. Courson, President and CEO of Central
Pacific Mortgage Company, on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Association).
29. Anne-Marie Motto, Note, Skirting the Law: How Predatory Lenders Are
Destroying the American Dream, 18 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 859, 863-68 (2002).
30. See Forrester, supra note 12, at 390-92.
31. "Predatory lending" has never been fully defined, and it is possible that a full
definition may not even be a practical goal. Interestingly, one report noted that a
survey of nine federal agencies (specifically: the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC, the
FDIC, the OTS, the NCUA, HUD, OFHEO, the DOJ, and the FTC) that dealt with
issues related to predatory lending failed to yield a single clear response to a request
for a definition. Report of the Staff to Chairman Gramm, Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, Predatory Lending Practices: Staff Analysis of
Regulators' Responses, August 23, 2000 available at http://banking.senate.gov/docs/
reports/predlend/predlend.htm (Aug. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Staff Report]. Although it
is common for writers on the subject to compile lists of predatory practices and use
the employment of those practices as a kind of working definition of predatory
lending, it is notable that these same nine agencies did not have consistent lists of
practices either. Id. For the purpose of this Note, a predatory loan is simply any loan
that contains terms that the law should deem unacceptable. Based on this
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2. Predatory Lending
Predatory lending has created a recent flurry of activity in
legislatures3 2 and in the academy.33 Moreover, a spate of recent
prosecutions and settlements suggests that law enforcement agencies
are beginning to take the issue seriously.34
Victims of predatory lending tend to be sympathetic groups that are
prone to manipulation. Often, predatory lenders target elderly
individuals who have accumulated equity in their homes.35 The
literature is replete with stories of individuals who have lost their
homes after being swindled by unscrupulous lenders.36 There tends to
understanding, a loan need not be subprime to be predatory. See Kathleen C. Engel
and Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1255, 1261 (2002) [hereinafter Engel & McCoy, A
Tale of Three Markets]. There is, however, a much greater fear of predatory loans in
the subprime market because of the lower sophistication and bargaining power of the
borrowers and the fewer financing options available.
32. On the state level alone, in the last three years, forty-one states (plus the
District of Columbia) have at least introduced legislation related to predatory lending
on some level. See Mortgage Bankers Association, Predatory Lending Resource
Center, at http://www.mbaa.org/resources/predlend (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) (listing
recent developments in a state-by-state directory); see also infra Part II.B.
33. See infra Part Il.D.
34. For example, Household International Inc. recently proposed a $484 million
settlement to end prosecutions from a group of states. Cassell Bryan-Low & Joseph T.
Hallinan, What's Behind the Big Charge? Take a Look at Household, Wall St. J., Oct.
23, 2002, at C1. Associates First Capital Corp., a subsidiary of Citigroup, had to
negotiate with the FTC because of alleged predatory practices and a settlement
amount in the $200 million range was discussed. Paul Beckett, Citigroup May Pay
$200 Million in FTC 'Predatory Lending' Case, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 2002, at Al.
Another recent settlement was in the amount of $60 million. Paul Beckett, First
Alliance Settles Predatory-Loan Charges, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A6.
35. National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Concerns for Older Americans:
Helping Elder Homeowners Victimized by Predatory Mortgage Loans, at
http://www.nclc.org/initiatives/seniors-initiative/helping-elderly.shtml (last visited
Feb. 23, 2003).
36. For a specific example, consider the case of Mrs. Mary Podelco who testified
before the Senate Banking Committee. She had fully paid off her mortgage and
owned her house freely when she was approached in 1995 by a lender offering a loan
of about $12,000. At the time, Mrs. Podelco's sole income was a monthly $458 check
from social security. The resulting loan payments came out to more than half her
monthly income. Moreover, the lender offered to refinance the loan (usually for a
higher total loan), and ended up doing so seven times. By 1997, Mrs. Podelco lost the
house which she had previously held with no mortgage. See Predatory Mortgage
Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 18-19 (2001.) (statement of Mrs.
Mary Ann Podelco of Montgomery, W. Va.). Of course, anecdotal evidence, on its
own, would be insufficient to show that a problem existed. Larger scale studies,
however, have also confirmed the existence of the problem. One study came to an
estimate putting annual cost of predatory lending at $9.1 billion. Eric Stein,
Quantifying the Economic Cost of Predatory Lending, A Report from the Commission
for Responsible Lending, 2-3, July 25, 2001, available at http://www.
responsiblelending.org/research/QuantlO-01.PDF (July 25, 2001, revised Oct. 30,
2001).
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be a very strong overlap between those who would normally receive
subprime loans and those who receive predatory loans.37 Individuals
who are more desperate for funds have fewer options and are thus
more likely to accept the terms offered by a predatory lender. Those
who have strong credit histories and higher incomes would not need
to resort to this type of financing.38 Generally speaking, both
subprime lenders and predatory lenders deal with populations
underserved by the normal loan industry.39
The negative social and economic results of inadequately restricted
predatory lending can have effects in areas beyond simple
overpayment or even home loss. For example, efforts at community
development can be quickly hamstrung if the residents of a
community are not able to obtain a home loan at fair terms, or are
losing their homes due to foreclosures on loans that were made
without regard to the borrower's ability to repay." Individuals whose
main investment is their home can see their entire net worth stripped
away by a second mortgage that they cannot afford to repay, which
was pushed on them by a predatory lender looking for a quick profit.41
Moreover, given the social costs of providing housing to individuals
who had homes but lost them because of predatory loans, predatory
lending affects the entire economy, not simply the individuals and
37. See Full Comm. Hearing on Predatory Lending Practices before the House
Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Senator
Charles E. Schumer), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/
52400sch.htm (May 24, 2000); Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note
31, at 1261;.
38. Nevertheless, it is at least possible that in a specific case an unscrupulous
lender who knew the borrower to be unsophisticated might choose to take advantage
of a borrower despite the borrower's strong finances.
39. This can result in, among other things, a disproportionate number of victims of
predatory lending that are minorities. See Schuster, supra note 6, at 155. Because the
elderly are often targeted, the most likely candidate for a predatory loan would be an
elderly minority borrower who has a significant amount of equity in his or her home.
Considering the trend towards gentrification and increased property values in
minority neighborhoods, predatory lending could very well become an epidemic if left
alone.
40. Community development is premised on being able to develop a small area
and allowing it to grow from there. The funds available from the federal government
for community development are geared for such a purpose. 42 U.S.C. § 5308 (2000).
If the area is losing equity because of predatory lending, however, the effort to grow
from a small area may be futile. One method of improving development has been to
educate consumers on how to avoid predatory loans. See Federal Reserve Board,
Having Faith in Community Economic Development, Capital Connections, Volume 3,
No. 3, Fall 2001, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/newsletter/2001/
fallOl/faith.htm (last modified Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Federal Reserve Board,
Having Faith].
41. For an example of how abusive and destructive this can become, see Predatory
Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 14-17 (2001) (statement
of Paul Satriano of St. Paul, Minn.).
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communities that are directly affected. 2
B. The Complications of Predatory Loans
Predatory loans can have devastating effects, but the problem of
predatory lending is compounded by the difficulty in creating proper
legislation to prohibit it. Predatory lending presents several issues
that prevent a simple solution. This section will identify some of the
complicating factors while stressing the need for a solution.
The difficulty in moving against predatory lenders is twofold. First,
identifying predatory loans can be tricky. There is no full and
comprehensive standard by which loans are defined as either
predatory or equitable. 3 The second (and related) problem is that
legitimate subprime lenders are apt to be harmed by any attempt to
regulate predatory lenders." Drawing overbroad legislation because
of a desire to err on the side of creating a comprehensive definition of
predatory lending could create a chilling effect on the subprime
market. 5 Such legislation would create the ironic result of shutting
out credit from the very population that the legislation was seeking to
protect. 6
Balancing the promotion of positive subprime loans and the
prevention of predatory loans results in a debate as to whether or not
additional laws are needed to prevent predatory lending. Some
42. The $9.1 billion annual cost is daunting enough. See Stein, supra note 36.
Nevertheless, it quantified only the actual cost in terms of excessive fees and lost
equity. If we follow the results of that further, including the fallout costs of
maintaining the victims of predatory lending (bearing in mind that it is typically the
elderly who are targeted), the costs would be even higher.
43. In fact, it is not even clear what makes a loan predatory in the first place. See
Staff Report, supra note 31.
44. Changes in the law might affect subprime lending dramatically.
A study of AFSA [American Financial Services Association] member loans
originated over the last 5 years suggests that the pending Federal Reserve
Board proposal would increase the number of first mortgages covered by
HOEPA from 12.4% today to 37.6%, and second mortgages from 49.6% to
81.1%. The effect, if not the goal, of these proposals will likely be to
substantially shrink the subprime mortgage market, a point underlined by
Freddie Mac's announcement in the Spring of 2000 that it would not
purchase any HOEPA loan, a policy now mirrored by Fannie Mae.
Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 378-79
(2001) (prepared statement of George J. Wallace, Counsel for AFSA).
45. See id. There is some evidence that this chilling effect has begun already. Lew
Sichel,man, Predatory Lending Law Slowed Borrowing, Studies Say, Chi. Trib., Nov. 3,
2002, at F7.
46. It is true that the very prohibition against predatory lending would shut out
some credit. As the Federal Reserve Board has pointed out, however, the lack of
credit caused by the shutting out of predatory loans should not be seen as a bad thing.
Regulation Z, Truth in Lending, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,438, 81,441 (proposed Dec. 20, 2000)(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). An overly restrictive law, however, might prevent
credit from being extended on acceptable terms.
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industry leaders have argued that the best way to protect both
borrowers and the credit supply is to avoid further legislation and
allow prosecutions of violators of current law in combination with
market forces to prevent predatory lending.4" Due to the recent spate
of successful litigation against large institutions that may have
engaged in predatory practices, the notion that current law will permit
prosecution of predatory lenders has gained support.4"
Some scholars, however, have suggested that large institutions are
not the main source of the problem.49 Rather, they point to a number
of small unscrupulous lenders who specially gear themselves towards
maximizing profits through abusive loans and who have refined their
techniques for lending on these terms.50  If a smaller group of
specialists are causing the problem, large sweeping prosecutions will
not be sufficient. 1  In fact, such prosecutions might worsen the
problem by sending borrowers away from legitimate institutions who
may simply be slightly abusive, and into the hands of lenders whose
entire goal is to squeeze the maximum amount of money out of a
victim.52 Therefore, even if present law has proven successful against
larger lenders, it is still not clear how useful it will be in combating the
problem as a whole.
47. Full Comm. Hearing on Predatory Lending Practices Before the House Comm.
on Banking and Finance, 106th Cong. (2000), at http://financialservices.house.gov/
banking/52400fen.htm (May 24, 2000) (testimony of Neill Fendly, President-Elect,
National Association of Mortgage Brokers).
48. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Additionally, some have pointed
out that there is apparently an adequate amount of protection in the system for the
abuses that have happened. "The regulators' citation of numerous court settlements
and decisions with large damage awards demonstrates that the practices they cited as
predatory are illegal practices covered by current law. No letter cited any abuses for
which there were no legal remedies." See Staff Report, supra note 31; Full Comm.
Hearing on Predatory Lending Practices Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Finance, 106th Cong. (2000), at http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/52400waa.
htm (May 24, 2000) (statement of the American Financial Services Association).
49. See Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1289-96
(explaining why mainstream banks will not be able to provide the necessary
competition to bring predatory lenders in line). But see id. (mentioning that,
occasionally, subsidiaries and affiliates of mainstream banks have been found to
engage in predatory practices).
50. See id. at 1282-84. Predatory lenders have also learned that such loans may be
disposed of as well. Kurt Eggert, Held Up In Due Course: Predatory Lending,
Securitization, and the Holder In Due Course Doctrine, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 503
(2002). In response, some of the newer legislative movements have been targeted not
only at those who make predatory loans, but those who trade in them as well. See
infra Part II.B. For a general discussion of securitization in the subprime market, see
Joseph A. Smith, Jr., The Federal Banking Agencies' Guidance on Subprime Lending:
Regulation With a Divided Mind, 6 N.C. Banking Inst. 73, 91-105 (2002).
51. Even if prosecuted, a victory against a predatory lender may not be helpful.
These lenders are typically not sufficiently capitalized to be able to pay a judgment if
one is granted against them. Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31,
at 1290.
52. For example, a borrower might turn to a loan shark who does not even have
pretenses of acting within a legal framework.
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The second part of the criticism against further legislation is that
market forces will lead to competitive rates across the board."
Scholars have suggested, however, that there has been a market
failure in the subprime lending industry that prevents normal market
forces from protecting consumers.54
Some groups suggest that certain existing legal remedies could be
used to punish predatory lenders." Using existing legal remedies
would allow a resolution of the issue without encumbering the already
highly-regulated lending industry with further regulations-it would
simply ensure that they are following laws that they are required to
follow anyway. Obviously, in cases of actual fraud, either criminal or
civil remedies can be pursued. Even without fraud, certain
contractual rules such as unconscionability might invalidate predatory
provisions in a loan.56 These causes of action, however, are often
difficult and costly to prove in court. Courts use doctrines such as
unconscionability rather sparingly, and the victims of a predatory loan
seldom have the financial resources to pursue a protracted litigation."
Other suggestions, based on civil rights themes, are novel, but
typically are acknowledged stretches from existing jurisprudence on
those laws.5" Moreover, proving every element necessary for a civil
rights suit is a rather circuitous and cumbersome method of
establishing that a loan was unfair.59
53. The Business Council of New York State, Inc., Council opposes bill that would
fundamentally change loans and lending (Mar. 22, 2002), at http://www.bcnys.org/
whatsnew/2002/0322lend.htm. (Mar. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Business Council, Council
Opposes]; see also Motto, supra note 29, at 897 (referring to a Brookings Institute
study finding that local anti-predatory lending ordinances hurt consumers, and that
better enforcement would provide a better solution).
54. See Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1280-98.
55. See Business Council, Council Opposes, supra note 53. Professors Charles W.
Calomiris and Robert E. Litan have pointed to studies that imply that current
predatory lending legislation can have negative consequences. Charles W. Calomiris
& Robert E. Litan, Homeownership That's Too Important to Risk, N.Y. Times, Aug.
20, 2001, at A17. Addressing the effects of the recent North Carolina statute, they
state that: "subprime mortgage lending by finance companies in the state to
borrowers with incomes below $25,000 has dropped by nearly 50 percent. For those
with incomes between $25,000 and $50,000, the drop has been one-third." Id. Instead
they advocate requiring additional disclosures, providing counseling, and increasing
activity by enforcement agencies. Id.
56. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981);
see also Motto, supra note 29, at 888-89.
57. See Motto, supra note 29, at 888-89. For a discussion of the difficulties of
bringing an action under laws that were actually geared to preventing predatory
lending, see Donna S. Harkness, Predatory Lending Prevention Project.- Prescribing a
Cure for the Home Equity Loss Ailing the Elderly, 10 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 12-27
(2000).
58. See Harkness, supra note 57 at 28-29 (discussing the applicability of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981 (2000), and the Fair Housing Act 42 U.S.C. 3601 (2000), to
predatory lending and stating that, under the current law, age is not a basis for a
discrimination suit).
59. For example, discriminatory intent or impact must be shown before a fair
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Thus, while some feel that predatory lending can be ended without
major legislative changes, others disagree and suggest that direct and
effective legislation is needed. Not only academics call for changes.
Much recent legislative activity seems to take the view that
improvement in borrower protection is needed." Moreover,
academics who have taken the view that legislation is needed have
also made suggestions as to what steps should be taken.6" All along,
however, the goal of protecting consumers, while protecting the credit
infrastructure that they depend on, is still at the forefront of the
debate.62 Therefore, when creating legislation to address predatory
lending, lawmakers face a particularly thorny problem.
C. Methods of Reform
Proposed and existing legislation aimed at curbing predatory
lending falls into three major categories: objective rules, subjective63
standards, and educational initiatives. Most actual legislative
packages have included elements from at least two, if not all, of these
categories. 64
Objective rules are specific guidelines about the terms a loan may
or may not contain.65 Typically, these rules are designed to affect
loans in the subprime market. This subprime loan market is targeted
by means of triggers that will activate the legislation.66 Triggers can
include such things as interest rates over a certain set rate 67 or a
defined variable rate over a certain amount.68 In addition, fees over a
housing violation will be found. Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One's Own: The Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Housing Discrimination Against People With
Mental Disabilities, 43 Am. U. L. Rev. 925, 980 n. 325 (1994). Discriminatory intent
or impact may be present in some instances of predatory lending, but the effort
needed to show it goes rather far afield of what should be the basic point of an
action-that the loan terms were patently unfair.
60. See infra Parts II.A-C.
61. See infra Part II.D.
62. Smith, supra note 50, at 107-09.
63. The term "subjective" can mean many things. In tort law, for example, a
"reasonable person" standard is considered to be an objective one because it relies on
the use of a general consensus rather than a particular person's perceptions. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 cmt. c. (1965). In this Note, however,
"subjective" is taken in the more colloquial sense which includes judgments that have
to be made on a case-by-case basis without recourse to an easily ascertainable per se
rule.
64. See infra Parts IIA-B.
65. Typical restrictions on balloon payments in a high cost loan would be an
example. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e) (2000).
66. See, e.g., id. § 1639 (referring to mortgages defined in 15 U.S.C. §
1602(aa)(2)(a)(2000)).
67. This is at least theoretically possible. Modern legislation eschews absolute
numbers, however, because of concerns that fluctuating interest rates could make
such a trigger unrealistically high or low.
68. In fact the federal law on this topic (which is discussed in Part I.A) has a
double fluctuation by allowing the Federal Reserve Board to adjust the number of
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certain amount are, used as triggers. 9 Using fees as triggers prevents a
simple displacement of the amount charged for the loan from being in
the form of interest payment to fees to avoid the legislation. Using a
trigger system allows loans that reach a certain threshold to encounter
special restrictions without affecting loans in the prime market, or
imposing a blanket usury restriction v.7 1 Another method lawmakers
use is to create a threshold based on the amount of money loaned.
Loans for amounts below the set amount are then subject to the
legislation.7' Objective rules have the advantage of being the simplest
for lenders to know how to comply with the law, and the easiest for
government enforcement agencies to enforce.72
Subjective standards are broad directives, used to instruct 73 the
lender in what to look for in making a loan. Rather than having
specific rules that the lender would have to follow, a subjective
standard will point at a goal or result that a legislature wishes to
achieve, without necessarily explaining how to get there.74 The danger
percentage points over the prime rate that will be used as a trigger. See id. §
1602(aa)(2).
69. Again, there is still some room for variation here, with the Federal Reserve
Board doing the adjustments on the federal level. See id. § 1602(aa)(3).
70. Economists believe that usury laws often are not in the best interest of those
who need the money most. By limiting what one can charge for a loan, everyone
whose credit risk outweighs the maximum charge will be unable to receive credit. See
Jonathan R. Macey et al., Banking Law and Regulation 158 (3d. ed. 2001).
71. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 24-1.1A (c-c2), (g), 24-1.1E (a)-(e) (2001). The
underlying assumption here seems to be that those who are borrowing amounts above
the threshold will have sufficient sophistication to protect themselves from predatory
lenders.
72. For a discussion of the "argument from efficiency" in favor of objective rules,
see Fredrick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-
Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 145-49 (Clarendon Press 1991).
73. "Instruct" is, in fact, what the standard does. An instructive role does not
mean that a subjective standard does not have teeth. The penalties for violating
standards can be every bit as strong. Rather, it means that with a standard, the law
will not tell a particular lender what to do in a particular case. Instead, the law will
tell the lender the way he or she should approach the question.
74. For a more nuanced description of the distinction between rules and
standards, consider the words of Professor Pierre Schlag:
It is possible to look at positive law (constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions,
and administrative orders) as a series of directives. The formula for a legal
directive is "if this, then that." A directive thus has two parts: a "trigger" that
identifies some phenomenon and a "response" that requires or authorizes a
legal consequence when that phenomenon is present. Directives serve a
number of substantive objectives such as deterrence, allocation of
entitlements, and inducement. Directives also have formal dimensions. For
instance, directives can be general or specific, conditional or absolute,
narrow or broad, weak or strong. They can also be rules or standards. Thus,
the opposition of rules and standards is one dimension of the form of a legal
directive. Corresponding to the two parts of a directive, there are two sets of
oppositions that constitute the rules v. standards dichotomy: The trigger can
be either empirical or evaluative, and the response can be either determined
or guided. The paradigm example of a rule has a hard empirical trigger and a
hard determinate response. For instance, the directive that "sounds above 70
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with standards is that if left unchecked, a vague standard could run
rampant." The reason for the uncertainty is that, in avoiding having
to deal with a definition of the problem, the lawmaker has simply
passed the buck. Typically, the executive or judicial branch will then
have to decide what is, in this case, predatory. In some cases this is an
appropriate step. It is not uncommon for a legislature to have a
regulatory body review an issue and create rules. 76  In this case,
however, it must be admitted that the legislators have not really
solved the problem-they have merely asked someone else to do it for
them.77
Finally, educational initiatives seek to curb predatory lending by
improving consumers' knowledge about the loans that they accept.78
These initiatives attempt to ensure that consumers understand
everything they agree to 7 9-providing full disclosure regarding the
terms of the loan,8" and increasing the consumer's knowledge about
the process of obtaining a loan.8" The idea behind such educational
initiatives is that when consumers have fuller knowledge of what they
are signing onto, they can better negotiate equitable terms, or at least
understand that they have other options, and can walk away if they
perceive the proffered terms to be unfair. 2 Educational initiatives
decibels shall be punished by a ten dollar fine," is an example of a rule. A
standard, by contrast, has a soft evaluative trigger and a soft modulated
response. The directive that "excessive loudness shall be enjoinable upon a
showing of irreparable harm," is an example of a standard.
Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379, 381-83 (1985) (internal
citations omitted); see also Isaac Erlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 258 (1974) (explaining the difference
between rules and standards in terms of the number of factors that must be taken into
account).
75. See Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1332, 1345.
76. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000) (creating the SEC through § 4(a) of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act).
77. Often, deferring to a regulator or other nonlegislative body is a convenient
tool to use in a situation like predatory lending where a definitional problem exists.
The advantage of such deference is the ability to create a rule that would, in theory,
do away with the problem itself rather than simply the factors that lead to the
problem. See Erlich & Posner, supra note 74, at 261 (arguing that creation of a
standard by legislature forces the court to take the role of rule-maker).
78. One way to do this is to require counseling before a high-cost loan is made.
See Ga. Code Ann. § 7-6A-5(7) (2002). Additionally, direct consumer education is
being practiced both by government, see Federal Reserve Board, Having Faith, supra
note 40, and by private organizations, see AARP, Avoiding Predatory Lenders, at
http://www.aarp.org/consumerprotect-homeloans/Articles/a2002-09-16-ConsumerAdv
ocacyHomeLoans (last visited Feb. 24, 2000).
79. For example, the Truth in Lending Act requires various disclosures about the
terms and cost of a loan. See generally 15 U.S.C: § 1601 (2000).
80. See, e.g., id.
81. See, e.g., id. § 1639(a)(1)(A) (requiring the disclosure in a high cost loan that
"[y]ou are not required to complete this agreement merely because you have received
these disclosures or have signed a loan application").
82. See supra note 78.
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have the advantage of being less intrusive into the actual loan process
than rules or standards, and allowing consumers to decide for
themselves if the terms offered for a loan are fair on their own.
Having reviewed the problem of predatory lending and established
the categories of possible responses, this Note now proceeds to review
some of the actual legislation that has been enacted, as well as
academic suggestions, in an effort to evaluate how these remedies fit
into the categories established above.
II. THE SEARCH FOR A CURE
Predatory lending is a difficult problem, but that does not mean that
no one has tried to remedy it. All levels of government, from federal
to municipal, have attempted to legislate the issue. Having discussed
the problem of predatory lending, the difficulties in finding a solution,
and the categories of legislation, this part now turns to some of the
actual and proposed laws on the topic. This part reviews federal law,
state law, and local law, and then discusses the suggestions of scholars
who have examined the problem of predatory lending.
A. Federal Law
Recently, there has been a great deal of state, and even local,
legislation regarding predatory lending. 3 Federal law, however, has
been the cornerstone of all predatory lending laws.84 Efforts beyond
this must be seen as variations on, or supplements to, existing federal
law. 5
The primary federal law dealing with predatory lending is the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA")."6
Congress passed HOEPA in 1994 as an addendum to the Truth in
Lending Act ("TILA")Y HOEPA's present form is a result of a
tightening of the restrictions that occurred at the end of 2002 after the
congressional banking committees held hearings about the
83. As mentioned in note 32, supra, forty-one states (plus the District of
Columbia) have at least introduced predatory lending legislation in the past few years.
See Mortgage Bankers Association, Predatory Lending Resource Center (listing recent
developments in a state-by-state directory), at http://www.mbaa.org/resources/
predlend (last visited Feb. 24, 2003). Many local authorities have done so as well. See
id.
84. Many of the state statutes are explicitly linked to HOEPA. See, e.g., Ga. Code
Ann. § 7-6A-2(19)(a) (2002) (tying Georgia's high cost loan thresholds to HOEPA's).
85. Note that some states have laws that mostly mirror HOEPA. See Dennis
Hevesi, New Curbs on Predatory Loans, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2002, § 11 at 1 (citing
advocates who feel that Connecticut's new law is not a substantial improvement over
HOEPA).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000).
87. See generally Regulation Z, Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604 (Dec. 20,
2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.226).
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effectiveness of HOEPA as it was then formulated.88
HOEPA's main method of operation is to set a system of "triggers"
that activate additional scrutiny and restrictions on loans that go
beyond certain criteria.89 The two triggers for "high cost" are the
APR of the loan or its associated fee." The Federal Reserve Board
has the power to adjust the specific amount that will activiate the
triggers.9' Once the loan has activated the triggers, HOEPA sets out,
in fairly specific terms, what the loan may not contain.92 Among the
prohibited terms are certain balloon payments,93 prepayment
penalties,94 certain payment schedules,95 and increased rates upon
default.96 Additional disclosures, beyond what would be required by a
normal loan, are mandated. 7
All of the above fit well within the scope of objective rules for
predatory lending. HOEPA defines who is included within its
protection and, specifically, what those protections are. In addition to
the other, more specific prohibitions, HOEPA also prohibits making a
HOEPA-covered loan based on the borrower's equity, without regard
to the ability to repay the loan:98
Prohibition on extending credit without regard to payment ability of
consumer. A creditor shall not engage in a pattern or practice of
extending credit to consumers [whose loans are covered by
HOEPA] based on the consumers' collateral without regard to the
consumers' repayment ability, including the consumers' current and
expected income, current obligations, and employment. 99
This clause creates a restriction that significantly modifies HOEPA
by forcing lenders to evaluate the borrower's ability to repay the loan.
To comply with HOEPA, a lender need not only remove certain
terms from what it will offer to subprime borrowers, but also change
the criteria on which the lender approves or disapproves loans. Even
though this restriction fits within a subjective frame, it is, however,
limited. Requiring that loan approval not be based solely on
homeowner equity is vastly different from ensuring that a loan is
generally appropriate for a borrower. The former requires that
additional reasons beyond equity be found to make the loan, and that
88. Id. at 65,607.
89. The definitions that HOEPA uses for the thresholds are found towards the
beginning of TILA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 1602(aa)(2).
92. See id. § 1639(c)-(h).
93. Id. § 1639(e).
94. Id. § 1639(c).
95. Id. § 1639(g)-(h).
96. Id. § 1639(d).
97. Id. § 1639(a).
98. Id. § 1639(h).
99. Id.
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repayment ability cannot be disregarded. The latter requires a full
investigation into the financial situation of a borrower, with the result
being a guess as to whether or not the borrower will be able to make
payments. Additionally, the section requires a "pattern or practice"
to establish liability," which would prevent a single instance from
being the basis of a lawsuit.
HOEPA has been criticized, essentially, for not going far enough.""
Although some see the statute as a good first effort,"2 even the
supporters of limited reform support lowering HOEPA's triggers and
including certain types of mortgages that were excluded from
HOEPA (for example, open-ended mortgages)." 3  The general
thought being that although HOEPA is helpful, a lot of predatory
lending activity is still possible without activating its triggers."' One
of the main trends in local legislation is to make HOEPA-style
protections that will apply to loans that do not meet HOEPA's formal
requirements.""5
Whatever HOEPA's shortcomings, it is still the only federal law to
address predatory lending head-on. Other statutes may be related in
some ways to predatory lending, but either their effect is uncertain or
they do not offer specific help for this area. For example, the
Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") seems to have an effect on
predatory lending, although it is unclear if it is positive or negative.""
Although with some modifications the CRA may serve as a deterrent
to a large bank, the average predatory lender will probably have little
concern about its degree of compliance." 7  Use of consumer
protection laws, such as the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
100. Id.
101. Margot Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate
Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. Banking Inst. 111, 129 (2002).
102. Id. at 130; see also Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at
1307
103. See Saunders, supra note 101, at 130.
104. Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1307.
105. North Carolina was the first state to do so and remains a model of state law
that has gone beyond the narrowness of HOEPA to afford greater protection. See
infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
106. For a full discussion of the relationship between predatory lending and the
CRA, see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The Community Reinvestment
Act: The Twenty Five Year Anniversary: The CRA Implications of Predatory Lending,
29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1571 (2002).
107. CRA credit is generally looked at when a bank wishes to engage in a merger
or acquisition, or when it wishes to open a new branch. Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D.
Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the
Community Reinvestment Act, 85 Geo. L.J. 237, 244 (1996). It is also relevant when a
bank holding company wishes to become a financial holding company under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and
Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 Iowa J. Corp. L. 723, 757
(2000). There is, however, no direct enforcement of CRA compliance, so a bank that
is in substantial noncompliance would not have to worry about its CRA rating unless
it wanted to make a change in its structure.
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("RESPA")"8 and the non-HOEPA portions of TILA, 1°9 is difficult
because these laws were not geared to preventing predatory
lending."' There have also been attempts to deal with other more
attenuated laws, such as RICO, with little success."' Thus, HOEPA
remains the best federal law to use in dealing with predatory lenders.
B. State Law
A large number of states have either recently passed laws dealing
with predatory lending or have bills pending regarding the issue.' 12
Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to review all state and
local legislation on the issue of predatory lending, certain
developments are worth mentioning. As explained above,'13 recent
state legislation tends to be structured as a supplement to perceived
deficiencies in the federal law on predatory lending. The fact that this
legislation is so prevalent may suggest a general dissatisfaction with
HOEPA's breadth. 14
1. North Carolina-The States Get Involved
North Carolina enacted the first state statute specifically focusing
on the issue of predatory lending." 5  The act specifically defined
general rules for all loans,1 6 created a special category of high cost
loans,' 17 gave additional restrictions for the high cost loans,"8 and then
created means of enforcement. 9 North Carolina's rule on predatory
lending is mostly objective, but contains a subjective element.
Regarding the flipping prohibition, it states:
"[filipping" a consumer loan is the making of a consumer home loan
to a borrower which refinances an existing consumer home loan
when the new loan does not have reasonable, tangible net benefit to
the borrower considering all of the circumstances, including the terms
108. 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
110. Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1306-07 (arguing
that the disclosures that TILA requires have not been sufficient to provide adequate
information to prevent predatory lending).
111. See, e.g., Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., 938 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. 11. 1996).
112. See supra note 32. These states are in addition to a large number of local
measures.
113. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
114. Even on the Federal level, legislation continues to be proposed. See, e.g.,
Predatory Lending Consumer Protection Act of 2002, S. 2438,107th Cong. (2002).
115. Richard R. Daugherty, Note, Will North Carolina's Predatory Home Lending
Act Protect Borrowers From the Vulnerability Caused by the Inadequacy of Federal
Law?, 4 N.C. Banking Inst. 569, 592 (2000).
116. See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-1.1A (2001) (creating primarily disclosure-
based protections); id. § 24-10.2 (creating substantive protections).
117. Id. § 24-1.1E(a)(4)-(7).
118. Id. § 24-1.1E(b)-(d).
119. Id. § 24-1.1E(e).
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of both the new and refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan, and
the borrower's circumstances. This provision shall apply regardless
of whether the interest rate, points, fees, and charges paid or
payable by the borrower in connection with the refinancing exceed
those thresholds specified in G.S. 24-1.1E(a)(6). 120
The flipping prohibition forces the lender to evaluate the
borrower's need for the refinancing and decide if the refinancing is to
the borrower's benefit. While subjective, the limitation of the
prohibition to refinancing loans, instead of a general rule for all loans,
prevents it from requiring too deep an analysis by the lender of the
borrower's needs.
Because it was first, North Carolina's law can be seen as a model for
other state statutes, and it is frequently monitored to evaluate the
effects of state predatory lending laws.
21
2. Georgia-Subjectivity, but with Safeguards
Georgia's recent law against predatory lending-effective as of
October 1, 200212 2-enacts a fairly straightforward and direct set of
rules dealing with predatory lending. The act includes prohibitions
that apply to all home loans, 123 as well as prohibitions applicable only
to high cost loans. 124  This structure allows the state to rule out
activities it considers generally harmful while still allowing protections
against other activities that are sometimes beneficial (but other times
harmful) by limiting those prohibitions to what could be considered
the subprime market.1
25
The activities that are prohibited in all home loans generally do not
apply to the main loan terms themselves but, rather, to activities and
120. Id. § 24-10.2 (c) (emphasis added). Although refinancing is often a legitimate
method of restructuring one's debt, flipping tends to happen so quickly and so often
that the benefit to the borrower is lost and the only beneficiary is the lender who adds
transaction fees with each refinancing.
121. See, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 45.
122. H.B. 1361 § 2, 2002 Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2002). However, OTS had announced
an intention to preempt much of Georgia's law for federal thrifts, in response to
complaints that the law was overly strict. Rob Blackwell & Erick Bergquist, OTS
Blocks Most of Ga. Predator Statute, Am. Banker, Jan. 23, 2003, at 1. One implication
is that the balancing act between protection of borrowers and promotion of loans is
still at work, and that, at least in the OTS's view, the Georgia statute goes too far
toward the protection side. The OCC has considered similar action. See 68 Fed. Reg.
8,959 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Feb. 26, 2003) (seeking comments
on a request to preempt the Georgia law).
123. See Ga. Code Ann. § 7-6A-3 (2002).
124. See id. § 7-6A-5.
125. For example, some restrictions on the use of funds obtained from a high cost
loan might be seen as cumbersome and intrusive were it not for predatory lending
concerns. See, e.g., id. § 7-6A-5(9) (requiring that, when the loan is used to pay a
contractor, an affidavit be signed that work was done, and requiring that payment not
be made by the bank directly to the contractor).
[Vol. 712118
PREDA TORY LENDING
terms that sometimes come along with the loan. 126 One of these is
inserting the financing for some types of insurance within the loan.127
Another prohibited act is "flipping" the loan.128  Also included are
restrictions on late fees,1 29 fees for providing certain information about
loan balances, 3 ' and encouraging default. 3'
The Georgia law affects the terms of subprime loans. more directly.
For these loans, it prohibits some kinds of prepayment penalties and
certain payment and interest schedules. 32 Additionally, it requires
counseling before a high cost loan is created.'33 Other rules include
certain jurisdictional rules that are advantageous to a borrower,' 4 and
special procedures for foreclosure of high cost loans.13 The law also
makes third parties who have purchased or been assigned such a loan
liable for violations of the law to the same extent as the original
lender,136 and requires notice of this to be written on any affected
loan. 37
All of these requirements seem to fall within the category of
objective standards. They are all specific rules that either prevent or
require various terms and activities. Nevertheless, the Georgia statute
contains a term that may be seen as leaning toward the subjective side:
126. This may be because, if it is not a covered loan, the terms of the loan are
considered acceptable. If, however, there are activities that are generally harmful,
they might as well be prohibited for everyone. See id. § 7-6A-3.
127. See id. Within predatory lending discussions this is often termed "packing."
128. Id. § 7-6A-4. The Georgia statute, which has a slightly more objective
definition of flipping than North Carolina's statute, reads:
Flipping occurs when a creditor makes a covered home loan to a borrower
that refinances an existing home loan that was consummated within the prior
five years when the new loan does not provide reasonable, tangible net
benefit to the borrower considering all of the circumstances, including the
terms of both the new and refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan, and the
borrower's circumstances. In addition, the home loan refinancing transaction
shall be presumed to be a flipping where a covered home loan refinances an
existing home loan that was consummated within the prior five years and
that is a special mortgage originated, subsidized, or guaranteed by or
through a state, tribal, or local government or a nonprofit organization,
which either bears a below-market interest rate at the time the loan was
originated or has nonstandard payment terms beneficial to the borrower,
such as payments that vary with income, are limited to a percentage of
income, or where no payments are required under specified conditions and
where, as a result of the refinancing, the borrower will lose one or more of
the benefits of the special mortgage.
Id. Note that in this case the statute goes as far as directly labeling the practice of
flipping as "unfair."
129. Id. § 7-6A-3(3).
130. Id. § 7-6A-3(4).
131. Id. § 7-6A-3(2).
132. Id. § 7-6A-5(1)-(5).
133. Id. § 7-6A-5(7).
134. Id. § 7-6A-5(6).
135. Id. § 7-6A-5(11)-(15).
136. Id. § 7-6A-6.
137. Id. § 7-6A-5(15).
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A creditor shall not make a high-cost home loan unless a reasonable
creditor would believe at the time the loan is consummated that the
borrower residing in the home will be able to make the scheduled
payments associated with the loan based upon a consideration of his
or her current and expected income, current obligations,
employment status, and other financial resources, other than the
borrower's equity in the collateral that secures repayment of the
loan. There is a rebuttable presumption that the borrower residing
in the home is able to make the scheduled payments to repay the
obligation if, at the time the loan is consummated, said borrower's
total monthly debts, including amounts under the loan, do not
exceed 50 percent of said borrower's monthly gross income as
verified by tax returns, payroll receipts, and other third-party
income verification. 38
While it is true that such a term seems to require a lender to decide
whether the loan is appropriate, it avoids creating a truly subjective
standard. The use of the rebuttable presumption and the listing of the
specific elements to be considered would suggest that the subjective
range of even this part of the act is limited.
1 39
The result is that Georgia has created an objective set of rules that
are aimed at predatory lending without resorting to heavily subjective
determinations. These rules eliminate the worst elements of
predatory practices and provide a clear but manageable framework
for making loans to subprime borrowers.
3. Florida -Subjectivity Without Safeguards
Florida's recent efforts to control predatory lending are also
noteworthy. Florida's Fair Lending Act sets out a category of "high-
cost home loan[s]"'4 1 and makes them subject to various restrictions.'4 1
The statute contains typical elements such as: controlling prepayment
fees, 42 no increased interest rates in the event of a default, balloon
payment restrictions, 1 4 no negative amortization, 145 no including the
first payments in the loan,146 no encouraging default,1 4' an anti-flipping
provision 1 48 and so on.
138. Id. § 7-6A-5(8).
139. The rebuttable presumption is a feature not found in HOEPA, and can be
seen as a means of balancing the subjectiveness of the rule with some objectifiable
criteria.
140. Fla. Stat. § 494.0079(6) (Supp. 2003). Actually, the law simply borrows from
the federal definition.
141. Id. § 494.00791.
142. Id. § 494.00791 (1).
143. Id. § 494.00791(2).
144. Id. § 494.00791(3).
145. Id. § 494.00791(4).
146. Id. § 494.00791(5).
147. Id. § 494.00791(11).
148. Id. § 494.00791(9).
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There are two provisions of particular interest in the Florida statute.
The first of these is the subjective part of the statute which says:
Extending credit without regard to the payment ability of the
borrower. -A lender making a high-cost home loan shall not engage
in any pattern or practice of extending high-cost home loans to
borrowers based upon the borrowers' collateral without regard to
the borrowers' ability to repay the loan, including the borrowers'
current and expected income, current obligations, and
employment. 14
9
While the requirement of evaluating the borrower's ability to repay
the loan is familiar, the rebuttable presumptions found elsewhere5 .
are absent. Instead, lenders are left to wonder, if they take a chance
on a borrower, whether a court will think that the loan was made
"without regard" to repayment ability. The law does at least offer
some protection to a well-intentioned lender by requiring a "pattern
or practice" before imposing liability. 51
An unusual provision in the Florida law is a restraint on the
marketing of high cost loans. The statute states:
Prohibited door-to-door loans.-A high-cost home loan may not be
made as a direct result of a potential or future lender or its
representative offering or selling a high-cost home loan at the
residence of a potential borrower without a prearranged
appointment with the potential borrower or the expressed invitation
of the potential borrower. This subsection does not apply to mail
solicitations that may be received by the potential borrower. 152
This restriction is useful because it focuses on activities particular to
predatory lenders. Often, predatory lenders find likely targets by
identifying homes which seem to need repair, knocking on the door,
and proposing a loan to cover the cost. 15
3
4. New York-Further Presumptions
New York 54 generally follows established patterns for objective'55
and educational 156 components of its law. Regarding the repayment
ability clause, however, New York's rule follows the opposite pattern
149. Id. § 494.00791 (6).
150. See, e.g., supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text; infra notes 157-60 and
accompanying text.
151. Fla. Stat. § 494.00791(6).
152. Id. § 494.00791(12).
153. See Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1282-83.
154. Apparently, as in Georgia, see supra note 122, the OTS found New York's rule
too strict and decided to preempt it for federal thrifts. See Preemption of New York
Predatory Lending Law, Office of Thrift Supervision, P-2003-2 (Jan. 30, 2003),
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/56209.pdf (Jan. 30, 2003).
155. N.Y. Banking Law § 6-1(2)(a)-(j), (m)-(q) (Consol. 2002), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?cl=9&a=2.
156. Id. § 6-1(2)(1).
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from Florida. The statute makes reasonableness a judgment to be
made on each loan. 5 7 To compensate, the statute allows the use of a
rebuttable presumption.' New York seems, however, to have a
higher standard of proof for ability to repay before gaining the
rebuttable presumption. California, for example, allows "any...
reasonable means,"'59 whereas New York permits reliance only on use
of information "as verified by detailed documentation of all sources of
income and corroborated by independent verification."' 6"
State governments strike a balance between creating the objective
rules, while still putting some subjective standards into place. This is,
of course, not true everywhere. 6' Where subjectivity exists, it is
typically tempered by boundaries. On the whole, states apparently
endorse the HOEPA model, providing triggers that set off a variety of
protections.
C. Local Law
In addition to federal and state efforts to curb predatory lending,
attempts have been made on a local level to control the problem. In
late 2002, the New York City Council passed, over the mayor's veto, 62
an ordinance that is aimed at reducing predatory lending by
prohibiting the city from having business dealings with predatory
lenders.'63 For example, companies which seek to obtain contracts
with the city must be in compliance with the policies set forth in the
law. Similar legislation has been put into effect in Cleveland, Ohio."M
While this type of legislation is standard in its formulation of
predatory lending, 5 the use of the government's spending power is
unique to the local level. The effectiveness of such an approach may
be limited. A small, specialized predatory lender is unlikely to be
harmed by the loss of such business.'66 In other municipalities, the
anti-predatory lending laws resemble standard state legislation.
Among these are Los Angeles 6 7 and Toledo. 68
157. See id. § 6-l(2)(k).
158. Id.
159. Cal. Fin. Code § 4973(f)(1) (2002).
160. N.Y. Banking Law § 6-1(2)(k), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/
?cl=9&a=2 (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
161. Virginia, for example, recently passed two bills to prevent predatory lending,
but these do not contain a subjective element. See H.B. 2708, 2787, 2001 Gen. Assem
(Va. 2001).
162. Kyriaki Venetis, NYC Council Overrides Veto on Ordinance, Nat'l Mortgage
News, Nov. 25, 2002, at 17.
163. See generally Proposed Int. No. 67-A, available at http://www.council.nyc.
ny.us/textfiles/Int%200067-2002A.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2002).
164. Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 737-02 (Apr. 23, 2002). The Cleveland ordinance
makes extending such loans a misdemeanor. Id. § 659.99.
165. See, e.g., id. § 659.01 (f)(2).
166. See supra notes 49-52.
167. City of Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 01-1476 (Nov. 18, 2002).
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Washington, D.C., has a colorful history in its attempts to regulate
predatory lending.169 In its enthusiasm to control predatory lending,
the Washington, D.C., City Council unanimously passed an aggressive
anti-predatory lending ordinance.'7u This may have been slightly
overzealous, as the original ordinance passed was so enormous,
confusing, and strict' 71 that it was suspended before it went into
effect.7 2 New forms of the ordinance are now being considered. 73
Because of different amounts of power and varied political climates,
local governments show an unsurprising lack of any uniformity in
handling predatory lending.17 4  Consistently, however, local
approaches to defining when a loan is predatory are similar to the
state and federal approaches.
D. Scholarly Approaches
A number of articles have outlined the problems that predatory
lending presents and have suggested methods to correct them. In
predatory lending scholarship, writers typically identify specific
objective rules they believe should be enacted. The exception to this
is the recommendation of a duty of suitability.
1. Proposals Geared to Objectivity
Donna S. Harkness has concluded that the federal and state
remedies existing at the time she wrote her article7 5 were insufficient
to solve the problem.'76 She has suggested that the best solution is to
provide counseling to subprime borrowers.
77
168. City of Toledo, Ohio, Ordinance No. 291-02 (Oct. 4,2002).
169. Sewell Chan & Sandra Fleishman, D.C. Council Suspends New Lending Law:
Moratorium Imposed After Industry's Outcry, Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 2001, at El.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Rob Blackwell, D.C. Council Mulls Anti-Predator Bills, Am. Banker, Jan.
23, 2002, at 4.
174. Robert E. Litan, A Prudent Approach to Preventing "Predatory" Lending, at
12, available at http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/00003594asmhksfkzepaxsef/Litan
Report93.pdf (Feb. 2001) (prepared on behalf of the American Bankers Association)
[hereinafter Litan, Prudent Approach] (featuring a chart of local ordinances that
ranged in penalties from a municipality not doing business with a predatory lender to
possible fines and imprisonment).
175. Predatory lending has generated much legislative and regulatory activity
recently. Therefore, any scholarship on the subject must be viewed in its own time. It
is not possible to say what new developments, if any, a given author would have
believed to be sufficient.
176. Harkness, supra note 57, at 43-45.
177. Id. at 45. A student Note, focusing on the state of the law in Ohio, has found
that there were inadequate remedies available for predatory lending victims in that
state. Anna Beth Ferguson, Note, Predatory Lending: Practices, Remedies and Lack
of Adequate Protection for Ohio Consumers, 48 Clev. St. L. Rev. 607, 636 (2000). In
reviewing possible solutions, she has recommended further regulation of the industry
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Kurt Eggert was particularly troubled by the possibility of evading
enforcement of predatory lending laws by selling the loans to third
parties.78  This, however, is also an issue he believes should be
resolved by what amounts to objective legislation.179
In a review of HOEPA and its results, Margaret Saunders has
found that predatory lending continues to flourish 8" and that industry
controls are unlikely to correct the problem.' She has advocated a
solution based on further legislation which would include
strengthening HOEPA through proposed legislation" 2 and changes to
other Federal laws such as taxes, 83 regulation of foreclosures, 84
changes in the CRA,"' and increased disclosure requirements.8 6
In a similar study,8 7 which also embraced some of the nascent state
laws, Cathy Mansfield has suggested that the appropriate solution
would involve increased disclosure requirements,' the education and
counseling of borrowers,"89 and basic rate limits. 9  Mansfield,
however, feels that the changes might work on either the state or
federal level.''
On the other side, Robert E. Litan of the Brookings Institute has
taken the position that HOEPA is adequate for resolving predatory
lending. 2' Moreover, he has asserted that improvement will occur
soon without any further government action, because of the public
release of Fair Isaac credit scores. 93
The above scholars consider the central issue to be finding the
correct limitations and regulations that could be put into place to curb
the predatory practices of certain lenders. 9 4 The proposals are mainly
geared to finding proper objective rules that would prevent predatory
and practices. Id. at 633-36. The changes that she has endorsed are primarily in the
objective class, with some mention of counseling as well. Id. In particular, the author
referred to the New York and North Carolina forms of legislation which were the first
two state laws aimed specifically at predatory lending.
178. See generally Eggert, supra note 50.
179. Id. at 636-38.
180. See Saunders, supra note 101, at 112-19.
181. Id. at 138-42.
182. Id. at 130.
183. Id. at 142.
184. Id. at 143.
185. Id. at 144-45.
186. Id. at 146.
187. Mansfield, supra note 3.
188. Id. at 570-72.
189. Id. at 572-73.
190. Id. at 573-75. This essentially entails a usury prohibition, a once popular
concept that has fallen out of favor. See supra note 70.
191. Mansfield, supra note 3, at 575. As the author noted, however, certain federal
preemptions would have to be removed before it could function as state law. Id. at
574.
192. Litan, Prudent Approach, supra note 174, at 7-9.
193. Id. at 15.
194. See supra notes 175-93 and accompanying text.
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loans from happening. There are, of course, some suggestions that
further information-gathering and education are also needed.
Essentially, though, the trend is toward an increase in HOEPA-type
protections for borrowers.
2. The "Duty of Suitability"
In contrast to the prevalent practice of recommending specific
improvements, Professors Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy
have suggested an entirely new and different approach to resolving
the problem of predatory lending."' They contend that the best
resolution will not be found in specifying exactly what can and cannot
be done. Rather, they believe that the solution lies in creating an
adaptable and strong protection for borrowers in the form of a "Duty
of Suitability."'96
In their article, Engel and McCoy review the factors that have made
predatory lending the major problem that it is.' 97 The article includes
a review of the trends in the mortgage industry, 98 economic factors in
predatory lending, 9 9 and the business practices of predatory
lenders.2"0 In doing so, they identify three markets: the prime market,
the subprime market, and the predatory lending market. 01 Further, in
reviewing the economics of the situation, Engel and McCoy assert
that, for various reasons, there has been a market failure preventing
subprime lenders from competing in a manner that will eliminate
predatory lending.21 2
The authors conclude that what is needed is a duty of suitability-
such as exists in the securities industry. 03 In the securities context,
suitability is a duty on a broker to investigate a client's circumstances
and recommend only those securities that the broker believes are
appropriate for that client.2"' To make this evaluation, the broker
must take the "financial situation, risk threshold, investment
sophistication, investment objectives, and other securities holdings ...
into account."2 ' In recommending a duty of suitability for lenders,
195. See Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31.
196. See generally id. at 1317-66. The authors point out that suitability requirements
exist to some degree in current lending laws, id. at 1319-20, but the extent of the use
of this "duty of suitability" is wider and more comprehensive than has been seen
elsewhere.
197. See generally id. at 1270-98.
198. Id. at 1273-80.
199. Id. at 1280-98.
200. Id. at 1259-70.
201. Id. at 1258-59.
202. Id. at 1299.
203. Id. at 1318. The authors also note that a similar duty is found in other fields,
such as commodities, certain derivatives transactions, and insurance. Id. at 1319.
204. Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable
Recommendations to Institutional Investors, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 1493, 1494 (2001).
205. Id. at 1495.
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Engel and McCoy propose a series of new federal laws and an
accompanying regulatory scheme, analogous to the one found in the
securities field, which would include federal regulation, state
regulation, and industry self-regulation.2 '6
They suggest that suitability is appropriate for various reasons.2 7
The main rationale is that predatory lenders ought to internalize the
damage that they cause.21" Additionally, the authors propose that the
problems of predatory lending resemble problems in the securities
industry. In both cases disclosure alone is not sufficient to prevent
harm21 9 because there is too much reliance on the person providing
the loan not to have a suitability standard, and the lender is best
situated to evaluate whether the loan is appropriate for the
borrower.210
Although the authors acknowledge that suitability left purely as a
common-law standard would likely cause a decrease in legitimate
subprime lending,2 ' they contend that if the lines could be drawn a
little more clearly by a regulatory agency with rule-making authority,
this danger could be averted.212 The authors feel that excessive
litigation is unlikely if the general standards could be shaped by the
wise hands of a federal regulatory agency.21 3
The element that makes the suitability approach radically different
from current law and other proposed resolutions is the tenor of the
legislative scheme. Until now, scholars have been content to identify
exactly what it is they consider unfair practices and to outlaw such
practices.2 " This arrangement leaves the borrower and lender to
contract freely as long as neither violates the law. Although
subjective elements are present in current predatory lending laws,
they are used more as stopgap measures-essentially to include what
would have been too difficult to define in precise terms.215
What Engel and McCoy advocate is a shift from a system that has
been primarily objective with occasional subjective features, to a
system with a subjective approach, but in which objective guidance is
206. See generally Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at
1337-57.
207. Id. at 1336.
208. Id. at 1360-61.
209. Id. at 1335-36.
210. Id. at 1336, 1358-59.
211. Id. at 1343.
212. Id. at 1345.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 175-94 and accompanying text.
215. Cf supra note 130. Had the legislators who drafted the current anti-predatory
lending laws wanted the subjective part to be relied upon entirely, they would have
had no need for objectified terms as well. Moreover, in these cases, the laws often
have a rebuttable presumption in the lenders' favor-a feature which the proposed
suitability standard does not seem to embrace.
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provided by a rulemaking process. 216 The framework of suitability is
ultimately subjective: it asks for a case-by-case determination of
appropriateness. Thus, a rulemaking system exists primarily to rein in
the potential breadth of such a standard. This is not to suggest that
Engel and McCoy advocate a purely subjective approach.217 They
hope to achieve a system that provides clear rules but still forces a
lender to take a borrower's welfare into account.
Legislation against predatory lending28 takes a fairly consistent
pattern. With some variation in determining which loans are affected,
most legislation contains: a list of features that a subprime loan may
not contain; prohibitions against certain activities by the lender;
disclosure requirements; and a requirement that lender believe that
the borrower can afford the loan. Most of the prohibitions against
predatory lending take the form of objective rules. The exception to
this is the common requirement of evaluating repayment ability.
Normally, this requirement comes with a range of protective devices,
but it is essentially a subjective standard. Most scholars believe that
improvements are needed, but they still endorse, either explicitly or
implicitly, the model that lawmakers adopted. One notable dissention
is by Engel and McCoy who argue for the imposition of a duty of
suitability.
III. A CALL FOR CLARITY
The current laws designed to combat predatory lending have been
attacked as inadequate. For a solution to be effective, it will have to
be one that reduces predatory lending without having too great an
impact on the subprime lending market.
This Part first argues that suitability is not an appropriate method of
combating predatory lending. Second, this Part rejects both
educational initiatives and subjective standards as remedies. Third,
this Part endorses objective rules as the best solution and suggests that
some of the problems with objective rules might be resolved by
216. Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1345-46. If Engel
and McCoy had simply wished that the present law be toughened, it would have been
easy to say so directly. The move to "suitability" implies a change in the attitude one
takes in viewing the relationship between the borrower and lender. In the present
scheme, the responsibility for the borrower's welfare ultimately rests upon the
borrower. Engel and McCoy explicitly reject such an arrangement as inequitable-as
they put it: "predatory lending is not about free choice; it is about the suppression of
free choice." Id. at 1358. They argue that "[w]hen predatory lenders target vulnerable
homeowners who do not understand what they are signing, and then deny these
borrowers access to vital information about their loans and hurry them into signing,
free choice is nowhere to be found." Id.
217. See id. at 1362. In fact the authors went so far as to add an appendix in which
they reviewed various legislative proposals and endorsed the versions of the rules that
they liked. Id. at 1367 app. Interestingly, the "repayment ability" clause was not
commented on.
218. See supra Parts IIA-C.
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creating more sophisticated triggers for activating restrictions on
loans.
A. Why Suitability Isn't Suitable
This section attempts to show that, despite suitability's intuitive
appeal, it is the wrong tool to fix the problem of predatory lending.
Suitability has been touted as a way of achieving the goals of a
standard while still keeping the specificity of a rule. Nevertheless,
suitability is an inappropriate approach for the lending context.
Engel and McCoy present a case for an approach that is, on the
surface, appealingly simple and straightforward. It attempts to bridge
the difference between objective rules and subjective standards by
creating a set of clear rules that require a lender to consider the
welfare of the borrower. Nevertheless, the suitability approach is
flawed. The flaws in using a suitability standard come from two areas.
First, suitability is not conceptually consistent with the roles of a
lender and borrower. Second, many of the dangers associated with
predatory lending may be resolved in a manner that is threatening to
the continuation of beneficial subprime lending.
1. Suitability and the Roles of Lender and Borrower
Suitability, when used in the securities context, is ultimately just a
method of ensuring that brokers are doing their job correctly when
offering a security to a client. A stockbroker assumes the role of an
agent and thereby assumes a fiduciary duty to act in the client's best
interest."9 Therefore, the duty of suitability properly becomes part of
the broker-investor relationship.22 Thus, the conceptual framework
easily supports the duty of suitability.
219. A professor discussing the duty of suitability that a broker carries explained:
There is a substantial body of law that states that a broker who recommends
an unsuitable security breaches its fiduciary duty to his customer. The
source of this duty is the common law of agency, which holds that an agent,
by virtue of his relationship to his principal, is considered a fiduciary with
respect to all matters within the scope of his agency. A fiduciary is subject to
duties that "go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to
further the beneficiary's best interests." The Supreme Court of Colorado,
for example, has held that if a broker makes a recommendation, or merely
brings a possible investment to the attention of the customer, the broker
may be in breach of its fiduciary duty to the customer if the broker ignores
the unsuitability of the investment, even if the customer assents to the
transaction.
Poser, supra note 204, at 1554-55 (internal citations omitted). Professor Poser points
to other jurisdictions where the fiduciary duty is not present. Id. at 1555. Even in
these states, the point remains valid because the nature of the relationship remains
one in which the broker is working for the client-in which case suitability can at least
be consistent with the broker's functions.
220. Id. at 1557.
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Lenders, however, are not the agents of the borrower. 22 Lenders
are the party at the other side of the table who exist primarily to
further their own interests. As such, a lender should have the right to
exist as an arm's length party who tries to maximize his or her own
benefit. To remove the right of the lender to act as a counterparty
distorts the necessary dynamic through which efficient transactions
can occur.
Attempting to bring the suitability obligation into the context of
home mortgages creates some difficulties. These difficulties are due
to context, not intent. Obligations to deal fairly in business and to
provide appropriate disclosures can hardly be criticized.222 Many laws
exist to respond to concerns that a more powerful party might impose
onerous terms on a weaker one; it is for just this sort of concern that
principles like unconscionability were developed. 223  The difficulty
arises when, instead of enacting rules to ensure fair play, government
tries to reinvent the rules of the game entirely.224
The oppositional nature of a lending transaction does not mean that
the law must take a callous attitude, but it does mean that it should
respect the positions of the various parties. The presence of
counterparties is not an accidental arrangement. Capitalism and free
market economics rest upon the assumption that everyone will
attempt to maximize their own benefit.225 To do so, each party should
at least have the freedom to act in its own self-interest. To remake the
role of a lender into a position of quasi-agent for the borrower, who
221. See Scott v. Dime Sav. Bank, 886 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding
that "the legal relationship between a borrower and a bank is a debtor-creditor
relationship that in and of itself does not create a fiduciary relationship"); see also A.
Brooke Overby, Bondage, Domination, and the Art of the Deal. An Assessment of
Judicial Strategies in Lender Liability Good Faith Litigation, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 963(1993) (questioning whether courts were even applying a good faith test to lenders).
There is an industry of mortgage brokers who could possibly be considered agents of
the borrower and, at least conceptually, it would be consistent to consider a duty of
suitability for these brokers. Creating a duty of suitability for mortgage brokers
would, however, probably be more trouble than it is worth, because the net result
would simply be the cessation of predatory lenders using brokers.
222. No one has suggested that fraudulent and deceptive lending practices ought to
be allowed. A lender who actively lies to a borrower is subject to existing laws and
can be punished accordingly. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
223. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual
Relations, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 617,621 (1983).
224. Cf. Nicholas W. Allard, Reinventing Rate Regulation, 46 Fed. Comm. L.J. 63,
81-88 (1993) (describing how, after deregulation, cable rates actually rose at a rate
three times that of inflation).
225. Maximizing one's self-interest can be described as the cornerstone of the
American economy. "Indeed, the entire premise of our largely capitalistic economic
system is the belief that reliance on self-interest will maximize societal welfare. The
central assumption of capitalism, of course, is that the individual's incentive to
maximize profits will lead to the creation of improvements in products and services."
Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. Ky. L. Rev. 553, 573 (1997).
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must constantly ensure that the results of the transaction will be in the
borrower's best interest, puts a lender into a schizophrenic state. This
obligation would create a perplexing situation where the lender would
always wonder who exactly they are lending to benefit.226
The difference in relationships is not the only issue that separates a
lender from a broker. There is a significant difference between the
position of someone looking to invest and someone looking to obtain
money to either purchase a home or make use of the equity in their
home. A prospective borrower might be more vulnerable in the sense
that they may simply receive a "take it or leave it" offer. 27 When this
occurs, however, they are in that position for a reason-they have less
to offer. Many kinds of securities are available to a prospective
investor and anyone purchasing securities ought to have the right to
find one that is appropriate for them. In making an investment, it is
the investor who is taking the risk. In making a loan, it is the lender
who takes the risk. If the borrower does not qualify for a loan on the
terms that he or she would like, then the lender may simply turn them
away. Often, when a legitimate subprime lender takes a chance on a
loan, the lender does so with the intention of benefiting the
borrower.22' Nevertheless, if the loan was a borderline one, there is
226. A lender with an obligation to look out for the borrower's benefit would have
a hard time knowing how to proceed. In securities, this is not a problem because the
profit gained by the broker is separate from the nature of the product being sold. In
the lending market, however, lenders make their profits by charging the borrower
more than the loan costs them. If a lender had to be constantly thinking of what
might be most suitable for the borrower, then a point would be needed to decide
when the lender could start being concerned with its own profits. Should lenders
always be concerned that they could get the borrower a better rate merely by
lowering their profits? Is there some margin of profit that the proposed regulatory
process would allow? If so, would suitability merely be a sophisticated method of the
government setting prices'? Engel and McCoy attempt to address this by appealing to
objective rules that would ultimately be set by an agency. Engel & McCoy, A Tale of
Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1344-45. Unfortunately, relegating the problem to an
agency does not solve it. If suitability means that a lender must have concern for a
borrower's situation, then the problem will not be solved by rulemaking. If suitability
merely means stricter rules, then the whole label is unnecessary and lawmakers'
efforts would probably be better spent refining current laws than creating an entirely
new regulatory scheme. A self-regulatory organization ("SRO"), as Engel & McCoy
endorse, id. at 1337-39, would have a similar problem. If there is no way to disconnect
the lender from the profit of the loan, there is no way to set objective loan terms
without creating some form of price fixing.
227. If, in fact, they receive any offer at all.
228. This is not to say that the subprime lender's motives are purely altruistic. The
subprime lender may be looking for a profit as well. Nevertheless, a subprime lender
might take the view that they are "doing well by doing good." See Full Comm.
Hearing on Predatory Lending Practices Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Financial Services, 106th Cong. (2000), at http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/
52400bar.htm (May, 24, 2000) (testimony of Steve Bartlett, President of The
Financial Services Roundtable). In fact, non-profit organizations, such as credit
unions, do make subprime loans with the specific intention of helping the borrower.
See Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 384-
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little to prevent a defaulting borrower from turning around a few
years later and suing a lender, who believed in the borrower's ability
to repay, 229 by calling the loan "unsuitable. ' '23" Loan making is very
much a numbers-oriented field.231 This does not mean, however, that
discretion is, or ever should be, entirely absent.
Imposing a suitability standard would also impinge upon the
freedom of contract. Each new loan created is, in essence, a new
contract made between two parties. There is nothing contrary to
traditions of contract law in establishing rules by which parties must
operate in formulating their respective obligations. There is, however,
a departure from the tradition when the obligation becomes to assume
the position of the other party and to decide if the contract meets the
other's needs.
2. Suitability Is Too Great a Risk for the Subprime Market
Even if the duty of suitability were consistent with the role of a
lender, it would be inadvisable if other, less invasive, remedies were
adequate. Because lending has always existed without such a duty,
the imposition of a duty of suitability could create radical changes in
the way lenders do business.
Before discussing why suitability would be harmful to the subprime
market, it must be reiterated that the growth of the subprime market
is both very recent and has overall been very positive.232 A solution to
predatory lending that causes a large drop in subprime lending would
harm many potential homeowners. Because the subprime market is so
new and so important, changes to this market should be handled with
extreme care. This subsection addresses some potential impacts that a
duty of suitability could have on the subprime market. The effects
that a suitability standard would have are not limited to those
discussed here. The results of radical change in the underlying rules
of a nascent industry are not predictable.
In evaluating suitability, one must remember that the mere creation
87 (2001) (prepared statement of Lee Williams on behalf of the Credit Union
National Association).
229. This raises the question of whether negligence in an assessment would ever
lead to liability on the lender's part. The laws cited in Parts II.A-B. all revolve around
whether the loan was made "without regard" for repayment. It is not clear at this
point just how intensive the "regard" would have to be to escape liability.
230. Engel and McCoy attempt to counter this argument by suggesting that the
"bright-line suitability rules in lieu of fuzzy standards, plus adequate documentation
by lenders of compliance, should keep frivolous lawsuits to a minimum." Engel &
McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1362. While it is true that clear
rules are the best way to provide protection for both the borrower and lender, the
issue is whether suitability is the correct notion to base rules upon. Rules based on
suitability would still give a borrower a large advantage in a lawsuit.
231. See Wilmarth, supra note 7, at 264-67.
232. See supra notes 7, 28.
2003] 2131
2132 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
of a duty would not, in itself, accomplish anything. To decide what
suitability means, interpretations would have to develop. These
interpretations could be extremely liberal, which would leave almost
no loan as unsuitable and, therefore, do nothing to resolve the
problem. Alternatively, these interpretations could be extremely
strict, which would effectively eliminate all subprime loans, and
possibly impact prime loans as well.233 Engel and McCoy recognize
this issue.234 To counter it, they suggest a regulatory scheme where a
regulator would create a system of per se rules to define the
parameters of suitability in lending. 3  As explained above,236
however, this merely shifts the focus to a new group of people, but
does not resolve the problem of actually determining the rules. If
creating a set of objective rules that adequately protect both
borrowers and lenders is impossible, then assigning regulators to do
the job will not make it otherwise. If, however, rules can be made that
would prevent predatory lending, then there would be no need for a
duty of suitability.237 If the area of predatory lending is so complex
that Congress cannot simply codify the rules needed to end it,
Congress could extend the Federal Reserve's authority under
HOEPA. 38 But at no point does it seem that a subjective answer will
work. Even as Engel and McCoy advocate it, they back away-
leaving no real change in the search for answers.239
Although it is not likely that education alone will yield the ultimate
233. See supra notes 44, 53, 55.
234. See Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1345
(discussing the possible impact on the subprime market).
235. Id. at 1344; see also supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
237. Of course, the same argument could be made for the securities area as well.
Securities, however, are still well-suited for the suitability standard because, as
mentioned above, supra note 219, the duty of suitability reinforces the correct
relationship between a broker and investor. Therefore, a duty of suitability provides
a good frame of reference for a broker to use in approaching his or her client.
238. Currently the Federal Reserve Board has authority to regulate three areas
that relate to predatory lending. See 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604, 65,605-06 (Dec. 20, 2001).
The first of these is setting, within a set range, the triggers for HOEPA. 15 U.S.C. §
1602(aa) (2000). The second is the ability to exclude mortgages from HOEPA that
are in the public's best interest, to include ones designed to evade HOEPA, and to
limit refinancings that are not in the public's best interest. Id. § 1639(l). Third, the
Federal Reserve Board has general authority to create regulations that encourage
compliance with, or prevent evasion of TILA (of which HOEPA is a part). Id. §
1604(a).
239. The extension of the Federal Reserve Board's (or anyone else's for that
matter) power to regulate predatory loans can be accomplished without adding the
element of suitability. It may very well be that Congress lacks either the time or
expertise to enact a comprehensive system to address all of the necessary issues. The
point is that suitability is not needed in this context. More than anything else,
suitability addresses itself to the relative duties and responsibilities of the parties. A
change to a regulatory system would not need to embrace this perspective to be
effective.
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answer to predatory lending,240 it is true that if an "information
asymmetry"24' exists, the best way to correct the asymmetry would be
to increase education.242 A look at the incentives created by
suitability, however, shows that education would likely become less
valuable to a borrower operating in a suitability framework. When
the borrower is responsible for ensuring that they are receiving a loan
that is appropriate for them, there will be a strong incentive to make
the effort to understand the loan's terms and to decide whether or not
to accept it. When the responsibility for the loan's appropriateness
falls upon the lender, a borrower will have little incentive to put any
effort into determining if the loan is beneficial. The risk of an
inappropriate loan would be borne by the lender. This "moral
hazard '243 would likely increase costs associated with providing loans
to the subprime market.244
Engel and McCoy also assert that their solution is a good one
because it puts the cost of avoiding predatory loans on the predatory
lenders themselves.245 As appealing as the solution may sound, it
ignores the very issue of identifying predatory lenders.246 If there is a
great deal of gray area that makes it difficult to distinguish predatory
lenders from legitimate subprime lenders, then subprime lenders will
bear a great deal of the cost of avoiding predatory lending.247
Lawsuits alleging predatory lending could occur any time a subprime
lender felt the need to foreclose. Subprime lenders' transaction costs
would increase, just as the need to gather and document more
information about each borrower to prevent the possibility of losing in
court would increase. Such costs would not only harm the lenders, but
240. See infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
241. "[P]redatory lenders need to identify people who are disconnected from the
credit economy and therefore unlikely or unable to engage in comparison shopping."
Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1281.
242. If the people who are "unlikely or unable to do comparison shopping," id.,
were to gain sufficient knowledge to identify when they are being exploited, it would
go a long way to ensure that these exploitive loans never happen.
243. "Moral hazard refers to the tendency of third party insurance to lessen risk
aversion among insured entities." Helen A. Garten, A Political Analysis of Bank
Failure Resolution, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 429, 429 n.1 (1994). By analogy, in the case of a
suitability standard, a borrower will be less risk averse if they know that there might
be an opportunity to escape responsibility in the event of default.
244. Increased costs to subprime lenders can result in one of two outcomes: either
the lender will abandon the subprime market, or the lender will stay and increase its
rates to borrowers. Neither of these results benefit those who need the subprime
lenders.
245. Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1335-36; see also
supra notes 216-17.
246. See supra note 31.
247. The subprime lenders will also be carrying the costs of any general regulatory
compliance that is imposed on them. Incorporation of externalities makes a great
deal of sense when the party that is benefiting from the externality can be identified.
Where the party benefiting from the externality cannot be identified, the benefits of
redistribution are lost.
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would likely increase the costs to the borrower to whom they would
be passed on. In such a case, the cost of the new regulatory
compliance would be paid by subprime borrowers, a group ill-
equipped to bear it.
Comparing a predatory-lending suit under an objective regime to a
suit under a subjective regime illustrates this point. First, take a case
of a legitimate lender who believed that the loan it made was in the
borrower's best interest. If the borrower falls on hard times and the
lender wishes to recover the money it lent, the lender must contend
with the possibility that the borrower will argue that the loan was
improper on the hope that a jury will be sympathetic. The lender
must then worry every time it makes a loan that there could be a jury
somewhere who will disagree with them about what makes a loan
appropriate. In other words, it will have a chilling effect, causing
legitimate subprime lenders to err on the side of caution. Lending
money to someone in need is not necessarily a cut and dry decision. If
lenders do not take reasonable chances, fewer loans will be made.24
Under an objective scheme, all that would need to be shown is that
lenders followed the law and they would be protected from such
litigation.249
Consider, now, the opposite case-where a borrower really has
been victimized. In a subjective scheme, the borrower would have to
prove that the loan was not fair. In some cases this may be clear,
while in others it might be murky. Jurors might decide that the
borrower should have known better and no relief should be granted.
By contrast, in an objective case, the rule would simply be applied to
determine whether the loan was acceptable or not. Even if not every
abuse can be legislated against, the presence of legislation, if well
crafted, would serve to reduce the prevalence of predatory loans and
the degree to which loans could be abusive, even if they did not
prevent it completely.
248. Fewer loans mean that fewer people with imperfect credit would become
homeowners. Engel and McCoy anticipate this objection and respond that the
problem is unlikely to develop because homeowners would be unlikely to risk their
homes by taking out loans they cannot afford in the hopes of winning in a suitability
suit. Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1359. Their response
misses the real objection. The problem is not likely to arise in cases of borrowers
intentionally defaulting on loans. Rather, the problem will arise when someone has
received a legitimate subprime loan but has failed to make the appropriate payments
(it must be remembered that these loans are high-cost for a reason-the borrowers
are a greater risk). In such a case, a subprime lender must face the possibility that a
subprime borrower will cry "suitability."
249. To reiterate, Engel and McCoy's suggestion of creating a rule-based
regulatory scheme simply distances itself from the aim of having a suitability standard
and moves toward an objective system. See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying
text. As a result, the suggested advantage of suitability over the current standard of
simple compliance with the law is one that will become moot as these concerns are
addressed.
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Suitability is not likely to produce a situation that creates adequate
protection for a borrower while protecting the legitimate (and
important) subprime market. Subprime lending has increased in
recent years because the lending industry has reached a greater
number of customers and a greater amount of profits by extending
credit to those who did not have an opportunity to borrow in the
past."" If a new duty were required of these lenders in a manner that
would dramatically reduce their profitability, lenders would lose the
incentive to target subprime borrowers, thereby reducing the number
of Americans who could hope to own their own home.2 1
It is easy to point out a major problem and demand a resolution.
Difficulties arise, however, in attempting to decide ex ante exactly how
much action is needed before the problem will be resolved. Recently-
passed laws,252 and laws that are still being passed, 3 go further than
prior protections. HOEPA's new and stronger form is also very
recent.25 4  Before radical change is considered, it might be worth
seeing if these remedies work. Impatience in observing a new law's
effects may have negative long-term consequences. 255
B. Education- Too Weak; Subjectivity- Too Risky
Education, though helpful, is not sufficient to end predatory
lending. First, there is too much knowledge that needs to be imparted
to allow a borrower to take a loan with assurance that no predatory
terms are in it. Second, as Engel and McCoy point out,256 there is too
much difficulty in reaching victims to educate them adequately.257
250. See supra notes 7, 28.
251. Further regulation of any sort may do at least some harm to the subprime
market. See supra note 44. There is some evidence that this has already begun to
happen. See supra note 55. If the regulation is done in a manner that makes a lender
fear tremendous exposure to liability, the effects can only be worsened.
252. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.
253. See, e.g., 2003 Ky. H.B. 240 (An Act relating to home loan protection); 2003
Tenn. H.B. 21 (Tennessee Predatory Lending Prevention Act); 2002 N.J. A.B. 75
(New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 2002).
254. The strengthened HOEPA regulations by the Federal Reserve System went
into effect on October 1, 2002. Regulation Z, Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604
(Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
255. See, e.g., John Cornyn, The Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to
Statehood, 26 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1089, 1140 (1995) (Justice John Cornyn of the Texas
Supreme Court citing Thomas Jefferson Rusk, President of the Texas Constitutional
Convention, explaining that the purpose of the veto power was to prevent the ills of
hasty legislation); Ian McCallister, Modern Reproductive Technology and the Law:
Surrogacy Contracts in the United States and England, 20 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev.
303, 316-17 (1996) (criticizing England's hasty passage of surrogacy agreements).
256. Engel & McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 31, at 1309-11.
257. "Reaching the potential victims of predatory lending is the biggest challenge
for any educational campaign .... [T]here is no guarantee that the individuals will
understand the information .... Until this country comes to grips with low literacy
rates, financial literacy efforts are not likely to succeed." Id. at 1309-10.
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Although Engel and McCoy object to educational programs because
they put the "onus on potential victims," '258 it seems that if a borrower
really had full understanding of the terms and still wanted to consent
to them, it would become difficult to say why the transaction should
not be allowed.
The best way to protect both subprime borrowers and subprime
lenders is to create a system of clear and comprehensible rules that
also afford significant protections. Ambiguous standards are of little
help to a subprime lender who is making a sincere and honest attempt
to comply with the law.259 Rather, objective guidelines that define
exactly what methods can and cannot be used best protect the
legitimate lenders.26 Recent laws passed to prevent predatory lending
illustrate that such rules are possible, and have primarily been
objective.261 If there is a need for a policy that simply prohibits loans a
borrower cannot afford, it should be done on a "pattern or practice" '262
basis that will avoid isolated incidents being used against a lender, and
should contain a rebuttable presumption that protects a lender-
assuming certain specified criteria are met.263 Such a policy has the
benefit of a "catchall" provision that prevents a lender from skirting
around the rules while still providing a clear method of compliance to
a lender who is merely looking to follow the law.264 Laws that require
evaluation of the borrower's ability to pay without providing
protection are dangerous and unpredictable."6
Ultimately, the problem with broad, subjective standards in this
context is that they are unnecessary. If predatory lending can be
stopped, or at least limited, through specific laws, then taking the risks
that a subjective standard entails would not be worthwhile.
258. Id. at 1310.
259. Gradually, a standard might be sufficiently fleshed out through case law to
give a lender a reasonable sense of what is required to avoid liability. At best, this
result would be equivalent to a strong set of objective rules. At worst, it might do
either too little or too much. Either way, in the interim, subprime lenders would have
no guidance as to what exactly was required of them. During this time, a sharp
reduction in subprime credit could be expected because lenders would fear the
possible liability if the law were eventually interpreted strictly.
260. For all the concerns of what methods a predatory lender might use to
circumvent legislation, in the end a mortgage is a fairly straightforward transaction
with a finite number of variations. In this respect it is a perfect candidate for
straightforward legislation.
261. See supra Parts II.A-B.
262. See, e.g., supra note 99 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
264. Stated differently, including objective features into the subjective portion of a
law moves it away from being a standard and closer to being a rule.
265. The laws reviewed in Part II.B all contained at least one protective feature of
"pattern or practice" or a rebuttable presumption. To ensure that this provision does
not get out of hand, future lawmakers would be wise to include both provisions.
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C. Suggestions for the Future
Because suitability is not appropriate for loans, and subjective
measures may backfire, objective rules are best suited for preventing
predatory lending. This section discusses ways of improving the
current system of objective rules to mitigate the sometimes harsh
results of inflexibility.
Rule-based predatory lending legislation can be criticized on the
basis that it is either too harsh or too lenient, depending on the
individual borrower. Subprime status, as addressed in current laws, is
an all-or-nothing prospect. A trigger is now set by a given interest
rate or fee amount. Those who are affected by the trigger are affected
by the legislation. Those who are not affected by the trigger are
generally unaffected by the legislation. By definition, if there is only
one cut-off there will be no ability to make distinctions within the
group. 66 If being a member of the subprime group makes one
vulnerable to subprime lending, then the degree to which one is out of
the prime category should determine just how vulnerable one is to a
predatory lender. This variation means that some borrowers are just
barely within the subprime category and are therefore being unduly
restricted by present law. Other borrowers are heavily within the
subprime category and may need additional protection.
Both HOEPA and state laws have done a good job of identifying
those characteristics of a loan which are most problematic. Certain
practices, while acceptable for some borrowers, can be devastating to
others. An example of this is flipping. While refinancing can be very
sensible in certain situations, when it is abused the results can be
catastrophic.267 The use of triggers is meant to prevent those in the
subprime category of loans from being at risk from these practices,
while leaving the practices available for others who are at less risk of
being abused.26 The result might sometimes be harsh in borderline
cases.
The best way to bring flexibility to predatory lending law is to
create a more sophisticated trigger system. To improve the triggers, a
system should be set up in gradations.269 Instead of having one all-or-
nothing trigger, several triggers could define different levels of
restriction. Then, the restrictions on the loans could be better
balanced according to how prone to abuse the particular practice is, or
the practice itself could be subject to gradations.270
266. In the subprime market, gradations already exist and are used by lenders,
albeit on an informal and lender-specific level. See Mansfield, supra note 3, at 532-35.
267. See supra note 36.
268. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
269. For example, a loan at 6 points over the prime rate might, be a Category 1
loan, whereas a loan 10 points over the prime rate could be a Category 2 loan, and so
on.
270. In this case, for example, a person might be able to refinance a loan X times
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Such a trigger system would encourage lending to those who are
just barely within the subprime group by having fairly liberal
restrictions on loans to them. Moreover, it would also allow law
enforcement to focus on a smaller and more isolated group of heavily
subprime borrowers. If lenders withheld credit from the more
extreme group, the problem would be smaller than if the entire
category of subprime loans was suffering for lack of credit.
On the surface, this system may seem more complicated than
presently-existing laws. Such a system, however, is clear enough that
a simple chart could be made to decide what category a given
borrower is in and what the restrictions imposed on them are. This
solution avoids the dangers that a subjective standard poses, while
mitigating the harshness of a sharp division between prime and
subprime loans. Moreover, if this plan were adopted on a national
level, with preemption in effect, the rules would be overall a great
deal simpler than having fifty different state laws and innumerable
local ordinances.
Although predatory lending is still a major problem, there is reason
for optimism. The recent flurry of legislation on the state level
suggests that state legislatures are willing to take action to address
predatory lending.271 The recent strengthening of HOEPA by the
Federal Reserve272 indicates a willingness on the part of regulators to
address predatory lending when necessary. Recent settlements273
indicate a willingness to prosecute lenders who make predatory loans,
and an apparent ability to do so successfully. If the resources of these
groups are geared towards eliminating predatory lending, then it is
likely that some improvement will be seen. Large changes do not
always happen overnight, but if the change is given adequate time the
results may be quite positive.
Abusive practices in lending are a problem that will probably never
disappear entirely. It may simply be an inherent part of human nature
to try and maximize one's benefit when lending to another. It is likely
for this reason that the first usury laws were developed.274 What can
change, however, is our sophistication and effectiveness in dealing
with abusive loans. If a method can be developed that gives adequate
protection to a borrower, without becoming so onerous that no one
wants to lend at a subprime level, it is a goal well worth achieving. If,
in the future, laws must be amended to deal with unforeseen issues,
for a Category 1 loan, but only Y times for a Category 2 loan. Additionally,
rebuttable presumptions might be set up according to gradations, with the
presumption in favor of the lenders getting weaker as the categories progressed.
271. See supra note 32.
272. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 34.
274. See Robert C. Ellickson & Charles Dia. Thorland, Ancient Land Law:
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 321, 399 n.440 (1995) (citing early
usury laws).
2138 [Vol. 71
PREDA TORY LENDING
the changes can be seen as further progress of the law. At all times,
however, the law should be clear, comprehensible, and cause as little
harm as possible to those it tries to protect.
CONCLUSION
Predatory lending is a problem that affects many of the most
vulnerable Americans and costs billions of dollars a year. Direct
legislation is difficult because it threatens to cut off an important
source of credit to underserved populations. Recently, many attempts
to combat predatory lending have been made. Use of a duty of
"suitability," similar to one found in securities law, is appealing but
ultimately unhelpful because of the differences between the securities
industry and lending industry. Because of the need for clarity and the
need to limit the exposure of subprime lenders to opportunistic
lawsuits, preference should be shown to objective rules rather than
subjective standards. Improvement in current law could best be
achieved by creating a more sophisticated system of triggers to
identify which loans require the most scrutiny.
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